自我同一性的倫理議題

“Who am I?” is one of the fundamental questions traditionally associated with Philosophy. It raises the long-standing issue known as personal identity. This course will begin by reviewing the main approaches to personal identity in contemporary Philosophy, mostly drawn from the Western analytical literature, while also paying attention to the Buddhist and Confucian traditions. We will emphasize that what might look like a single unitary question actually covers several different ones: for example, am I fundamentally a physical, or spiritual entity? Or alternatively, what are the central characteristics that make me the particular person I am? We will also delve into the complexities of the relation between personal identity and prudential value (“what matters”, as Derek Parfit put it). In the second part of the course, we will proceed to consider to what extent this theoretical framework can help illuminate debates around ethical issues including abortion, our obligations to future generations, genetic interventions, human enhancement, and the quest to extend life beyond the grave.

1. Gain familiarity with the key concepts and prominent positions on the topic of personal identity in contemporary Philosophy. 2. Understand how, and to what extent, these positions have a bearing on various issues in applied ethics. 3. Critically discuss and evaluate the main arguments and positions on the issues discussed in the course. 4. Demonstrate the ability to clearly articulate one’s own arguments and views on these issues, both in oral discussion and in writing.

a. Class participation (30%): - Attendance, completion of required readings & participation in discussion (10%) - one or two oral presentations (depending on class numbers) (20%) b. Mid-term paper (35%): Write a paper (min. 3,000 words long, in English) on any topic discussed between weeks 2 and 10. c. Second paper (35%): Write a paper (min. 3,000 words long, in English) on a different topic from the first paper.

Required readings: § Ames, R. T. “The Chinese Conception of Selfhood”. In: Deutsch, Eliot, and Bontekoe, Ron (eds.). A Companion to World Philosophies. Blackwell Publishing, 1997, pp. 148-54. § DeGrazia, D. “Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of our Existence”. Philosophy & Public Affairs 31:4 (2003), pp. 413-42. § DeGrazia, D. Human Identity and Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. (Selected chapters) § DeGrazia, D. Creation Ethics: Reproduction, Genetics, and Quality of Life. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. (Selected chapters) § Giles, J. “The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity”. Philosophy East and West 43:2 (1993), pp. 175-200. § McMahan, J. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. (Selected chapters) § Parfit, D. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. (Selected chapters) § Sauchelli, A. Personal Identity and Applied Ethics: a Historical and Philosophical Introduction. London: Taylor & Francis, 2018. (Selected chapters, although the whole book is of relevance to this course) § Shoemaker, D. “The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics”. Bioethics 24:9 (2010), pp. 481-9. § Shoemaker, D. “Personal Identity and Ethics”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-ethics/ [accessed 02/08/2019]. § Wong, D. “Relational and Autonomous Selves”. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31:4 (2004), pp. 419-32. Recommended readings: § DeGrazia, D. “Using Pharmaceuticals to Change Personality: Self-Transformation, Identity, and Authenticity”. In: Ho, D. (ed.), Philosophical Issues in Pharmaceutics. Dordrecht: Springer, 2017, pp. 177-188. § Erler, A. “How to Avoid Mischaracterization in the Identity Debate”. Unpublished manuscript. § Flanagan, O. and Rorty, A. O. (eds.). Identity, Character and Morality. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1990, pp. 19-36. § Furberg, E. “Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem?”. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37:1 (2012), pp. 60-73. § Kind, A. Persons and Personal Identity. Oxford: Polity Press, 2015. § Lindemann, H. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001. § Mackenzie, C. and Walker, M. “Neurotechnologies, Personal Identity, and the Ethics of Authenticity”. In: Clausen, J., and Levy, N. (eds.). Handbook of Neuroethics. Dordrecht: Springer, 2015, pp. 373-92. § Martin, R. and Barresi, J. (eds.). Personal Identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. § Mogensen, A. “Is Identity Illusory?”. European Journal of Philosophy 29:1 (2021), pp. 55-73. § Nagel, T. The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. § Olson, E. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. § Savulescu, J., Ter Meulen, R., and Kahane, G. (eds.). Enhancing Human Capacities. Chichester, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2011. § Schechtman, M. The Constitution of Selves. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. § Schechtman, M. Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. § Shoemaker, D. Personal Identity and Ethics: a Brief Introduction. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2009. § Shoemaker, S. & Swinburne, R. (eds.). Personal Identity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. § Witt, K. et al. “Deep Brain Stimulation and the Search for Identity”. Neuroethics 6 (2013), pp. 499-511.