心智模擬的知識論:記憶與想像如何形塑生活
Epistemology of mental simulation: What and how we live and learn through memory and imagination
| 節 | 週二 |
|---|---|
5 13:20–14:10 | 心智模擬的知識論:記憶與想像如何形塑生活 YX202 3 節連堂 |
6 14:20–15:10 | |
7 15:30–16:20 |
* 根據陽明交大上課時間表所列
What makes memories memories? We have all had the experience of remembering something incorrectly. Can such memory errors still give rise to knowledge or be epistemically beneficial? Indeed, in the case of complete confabulations, is that still memory, or merely imagination? Imagination makes us free and allows our mind to run wild. However, we also rely on imagination for real life, including practical things like planning for future trips, thinking about what would have happened if a past decision were made differently, and brainstorming new ideas for scientific projects. How does imagination give rise to knowledge? The aim of this course is to introduce you to the epistemological issues concerning mental simulation in philosophy. Mental simulation refers to the cognitive capacity to go beyond perception to represent what is not present in the immediate environment. Memory and imagination are typical examples of mental simulation. “Epistemological issues” are issues concerning knowledge, understanding and wisdom. The most general question we will ask is whether we can get knowledge, understanding, or wisdom via mental simulation, and if so, how. More specific topics to be discussed include: The different epistemic roles of mental simulation How mental simulation are involved in scientific practices and decision-making in life Self and self-knowledge in remembering and imagining How to understand delusions and confabulations Comparing mental simulation with virtual reality How technology can assist our memory and imagination Dreaming as imagining, hallucinating, or mind-wandering? By examining the literature and arguments, you will familiarize yourself with these issues and develop the ability to analyze and be critical to philosophical arguments.
Discussions and participation: 20% Summaries and comments on reading assignments: 40% Term paper: 40%
| 週次 | 主題 |
|---|---|
| 第 1 週 | Introduction |
| 第 2 週 | Mental simulation: Memory and imagination |
| 第 3 週 | Satisfaction conditions of memory and imagination |
| 第 4 週 | Epistemic uses of memory and imagination (I) |
| 第 5 週 | Epistemic uses of memory and imagination (II) |
| 第 6 週 | Perspectives and self in memory and imagination |
| 第 7 週 | Narratives and self (I) |
| 第 8 週 | Narratives and self (II) |
| 第 9 週 | Epistemic innocence |
| 第 10 週 | Mental simulation and decision-making |
| 第 11 週 | Transformative experience |
| 第 12 週 | Dreaming: Imagining, hallucinating or mind-wandering in sleep? |
| 第 13 週 | Mental simulation v.s. artificial simulation |
| 第 14 週 | Extended cognition and technology (I) |
| 第 15 週 | Extended cognition and technology (II) |
| 第 16 週 | Mental simulation in scientific practice |
| 第 17 週 | Flexible learning week (I) |
| 第 18 週 | Flexible learning week (II) |
Badura, C., & Kind, A. (eds.). (2021). Epistemic uses of imagination. Routledge. Balcerak Jackson, M. (2016). On the epistemic value of imagining, supposing, and conceiving. In A. Kind and P. Kun (eds.), Knowledge through imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bortolotti, L. (2015). The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions. Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 490–499. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.005 Byrne, R. (2005). The rational imagination: How people create alternatives to reality. Cambridge: MIT Press. Gauker, C. (2021). Imagination constrained, imagination constructed. Inquiry 0 (0): 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1933748. Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds). (2002). Conceivability and possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldie, P. (2014). The mess inside: Narrative, emotion, and the mind. Oxford University Press. Heersmink, R., & Carter, J. A. (2020). The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values. Memory Studies, 13(4), 416–433. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017703810. Kind, A. (2018). How imagination gives rise to knowledge. In F. Macpherson & F. Dorsch (eds), Perceptual imagination and perceptual memory. Oxford University Press. https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198717881.001.0001/oso-9780198717881-chapter-11. Kind, Amy. (2020). What imagination teaches. In J. Schwenkler & E. Lambert (eds.), Becoming someone new: Essays on transformative experience, choice, and change.Oxford University Press. Kind, A. & Kung, P. (eds.). (2016). Knowledge through imagination. Oxford University Press. Langland-Hassan, P. (2020). Explaining imagination. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. McCarroll, C. (2018). Remembering from the outside: Personal memory and the perspectival mind. Oxford University Press. Myers, J. (2021). The epistemic status of the imagination. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01600-1. Rucińska, Z., & Gallagher, S. (2021). Making imagination even more embodied: Imagination, constraint and epistemic relevance. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03156-x. Salis, F. & Frigg, R. (2020). Capturing the scientific imagination. In A. Levy & P. Godfrey-Smith (eds), The Scientific Imagination. Oxford University Press. https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190212308.001.0001/oso-9780190212308-chapter-2.