語言哲學
Philosophy of Language
學期
111-1
學分
3
學分
當期課號
133102
永久課號
SHPH30008
開課單位
心智哲學研究所
授課教師
鄭凱元
校區
陽明
類別
必修
上課時間表
| 節 | 週五 |
|---|---|
9 17:30–18:20 | 語言哲學 YX211 3 節連堂 |
A 18:30–19:20 | |
B 19:30–20:20 |
* 根據陽明交大上課時間表所列
概述
The aim of this seminar is to lead a journey for the students into some of the problems that lie at the heart of the philosophy of language in particular and philosophy in general, by reading classic as well as some of the most vigorous contemporary works in the related fields.
評分方式
Students are required to take turns leading discussions and write a final term paper.
週次計畫
| 週次 | 主題 |
|---|---|
| 第 1 週 | Introduction |
| 第 2 週 | Kremer, M. (2010). Sense and reference: The origins and development of the distinction. In T. Ricketts & M. Potter (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Frege (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, pp. 220-292). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
| 第 3 週 | Kremer, Michael, 'The Whole Meaning of a Book of Nonsense: Reading Wittgenstein’s Tractatus', in Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy (2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 Oct. 2013). |
| 第 4 週 | Ebbs, G. (2017). Reading Quine’s Claim That No Statement Is Immune to Revision. In Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry (pp. 168-188). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
| 第 5 週 | Harman, G. (2014). Indeterminacy, Relativity, and Behaviorism. In A Companion to W.V.O. Quine (eds G. Harman and E. Lepore). |
| 第 6 週 | Kripke, Saul A., 'Identity and Necessity', Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (2011; online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 Jan. 2012). |
| 第 7 週 | Saul A., Kripke, 'Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities', Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (2011; online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 Jan. 2012). |
| 第 8 週 | Kripke, Saul (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition. Harvard University Press. |
| 第 9 週 | Kripke, Saul (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition. Harvard University Press. |
| 第 10 週 | Zalabardo, J. (1997). Kripke's Normativity Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 27(4), 467-488. |
| 第 11 週 | Zalabardo, J. L. (2009). One Strand in the Rule-Following Considerations. Synthese, 171(3), 509–519. Ginsborg, Hannah (2020). Wittgenstein on Going On. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):1-17. |
| 第 12 週 | Alexander Miller, BLIND RULE-FOLLOWING AND THE ‘ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 65, Issue 260, July 2015, Pages 396–416. |
| 第 13 週 | Oldfarb, Warren G. (2012). Rule-Following Revisited. In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. |
| 第 14 週 | MacFarlane, John (2010). Pragmatism and inferentialism. In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici_. Routledge. pp. 81--95. |
| 第 15 週 | Kremer, Michael (2010). Representation or Inference: Must We Choose? Should We? In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explicit. Routledge. pp. 227--246 |
| 第 16 週 | Johnston, M. (2007). Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75(2), 233–268. |
| 第 17 週 | Student presentations |
| 第 18 週 | Roundtable Discussions |