破碎的心智:理性與不一致的信念
The FragmentedMind: Rationality and Inconsistent Beliefs
| 節 | 週五 |
|---|---|
5 13:20–14:10 | 破碎的心智:理性與不一致的信念 YX321 2 節連堂 |
6 14:20–15:10 |
* 根據陽明交大上課時間表所列
Mental fragmentation is the thesis that the mind is fragmented, or compartmentalized. On this view of the mind, the information that is used by cognitive processes is stored in distinct, independently accessible data structures (fragments). In terms of belief, for example, this means that an agent’s overall belief state is divided into several sub-states-fragments. These fragments need not make for a consistent and closed belief system. Rather, an agent may have a number of beliefs in one fragment, while having other beliefs in a different fragment, without drawing connections between these fragments. In this way agents may hold inconsistent beliefs because they are stored in different fragments. This course examines this view of the mind. It studies in depth a new collection of essays that focus on the hypothesis that the mind is fragmented. It explores such topics as foundational issues and motivations for fragmentation; the features common to distinct versions of the idea that the mind is fragmented; how the fragmented mind is implemented in cognitive architecture; how the fragmented mind thesis compares with a rival thesis on which the mind is unified; the rationality or irrationality of fragmentation; fragmentation’s role in language; the relationship between fragmentation and mental files; and the implications of fragmentation for the analysis of implicit attitudes.
Students are requested to come to each class with 2–3 questions for discussion, and participation will count for 10% of the final grade. Graduate students will be expected to write 10 short reflection pieces (max 500 words each, 50%), and a term paper on a topic of their choice (~3000 words, 40%). Undergraduate students will write 5 short reflections pieces (500 words each, 50%) and a short final paper on a topic of their choice (1500 words, 40%).
| 週次 | 主題 |
|---|---|
| 第 1 週 | Introduction and Course Overview |
| 第 2 週 | Fragmentation and Information Access |
| 第 3 週 | Fragmentation and Coarse-Grained Content |
| 第 4 週 | The Fragmentation of Belief |
| 第 5 週 | Fragmented Models of Belief |
| 第 6 週 | Rationality in Fragmented Belief Systems |
| 第 7 週 | Fragmented but Rational |
| 第 8 週 | Fragmentation and Singular Propositions |
| 第 9 週 | On the Availability of Presuppositions in Conversation |
| 第 10 週 | Do Mental Files Obey Strawson's Constraint? |
| 第 11 週 | Belief Fragments and Mental Files |
| 第 12 週 | Implicit Attitudes are (Probably) Beliefs |
| 第 13 週 | Implicit Bias and the Fragmented Mind |
| 第 14 週 | Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate |
| 第 15 週 | The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief |
| 第 16 週 | Open Discussion and Questions |
| 第 17 週 | 彈性授課 |
| 第 18 週 | 彈性授課 |