心智自主與知識權利:以假新聞與認知戰為案例研究
Mental Autonomy and Epistemic Rights: Fake News and Cognitive Warfare as Case Studies
| 節 | 週五 |
|---|---|
3 10:10–11:00 | 心智自主與知識權利:以假新聞與認知戰為案例研究 YX206 3 節連堂 |
4 11:10–12:00 | |
N 12:20–13:10 |
* 根據陽明交大上課時間表所列
The aim of this course is to introduce you to the key concepts and issues concerning mental autonomy and epistemic rights in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Mental autonomy refers to “the ability to control one's own mental functions” (Metzinger, 2015), like attention, memory, planning, decision-making, judgments, etc, whereas epistemic rights refer to the rights to information, knowledge, truth, etc (Watson, 2021). In this course, we will explore the limits of our mental agency and autonomy, how we can understand our epistemic rights based on the extent of our mental autonomy, and when our epistemic rights are violated. We will focus on fake news and cognitive warfare as case studies.
Discussions and participation: 20% Comments on weekly reading assignments: 40% Term paper: 40%
| 週次 | 主題 |
|---|---|
| 第 1 週 | Introduction |
| 第 2 週 | What is mental agency? |
| 第 3 週 | Mental agency and mental actions |
| 第 4 週 | The limits of mental agency and autonomy (I) |
| 第 5 週 | The limits of mental agency and autonomy (II) |
| 第 6 週 | What are epistemic rights? |
| 第 7 週 | Who has epistemic rights? |
| 第 8 週 | When are epistemic rights violated? |
| 第 9 週 | Who gets hurt? |
| 第 10 週 | Why do we need epistemic autonomy and rights? |
| 第 11 週 | Epistemic rights in a polarized world |
| 第 12 週 | Case study: Fake news (I) |
| 第 13 週 | Case study: Fake news (II) |
| 第 14 週 | Case study: Cognitive warfare (I) |
| 第 15 週 | Case study: Cognitive warfare (II) |
| 第 16 週 | General discussions |
| 第 17 週 | |
| 第 18 週 |
Bernecker, S., Flowerree, A. K., & Grundmann, T. (Eds.). (2021). The Epistemology of fake News (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001 Edidin, A. (2022). Epistemic agency and the value of knowledge and belief. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 8, 16. Engel, P. (2013). Is epistemic agency possible? Philosophical Issues, 23(1), 158–178. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12008 Houlders, J. W., Bortolotti, L., & Broome, M. R. (2021). Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs. Synthese, 199(3–4), 7689–7704. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03133-4 Matheson, J., & Lougheed, K. (Eds.). (2022). Epistemic autonomy. Routledge. McGrath, M. (2022). A limitation on agency in judgment. Synthese, 200(2), 88. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03616-y Watson, L. (2020). Epistemic rights in a polarised world: The right to know and the abortion debate. In Tanesini, A. and Lynch, M. (eds.) Polarisation, arrogance, and dogmatism: Philosophical perspectives. London: Routledge. Watson, L. (2021). The right to know: Epistemic rights and why we need them. Routledge.