心靈塑造

Folk psychology is typically thought of as the practice of making sense of a person’s actions using propositional attitudes. When we engage in folk psychology, we typically ascribe mental states (propositional attitudes such as beliefs/desires/intentions/wishes) to other agents. A key question is why we engage in folk psychology. What is the function of folk psychology? Why do we think about and ascribe mental states to other people? On the standard view, the function of folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, i.e., for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. For example, I explain why my friend walked towards the fridge because I assume he has a desire for water and a belief that there is water in the fridge. In contrast, according to the mindshaping hypothesis (McGeer 2007; Zawidzki 2008, 2013), folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping; that is, folk psychology functions primarily for moulding people’s minds and behaviour. This is achieved, for example, through the imposition of social norms, so that social coordination becomes easier. Folk psychological practices are not primarily for predicting the behaviour of others but for shaping the behaviour of others, which enables social coordination and cohesion. On the mindshaping view, human cognition is, to a large extent, constructed through cultural practices. In this course we examine the mindshaping hypothesis and explore its implications for human cognition and cognitive practices. Objectives The goal of the course is to further students’ familiarity with some of the fundamental issues in philosophy of mind and cognition with a focus on the use of ascriptions of folk psychological states and the mindshaping hypothesis in social cognition. By the end of the course students should be comfortable discussing some of the central problems in this field, offering critical responses to proposed solutions to these problems, and using their understanding to engage critically with the theories. Specifically, students should will be able to: 1. Demonstrate an awareness of some of the central problems in philosophy of social cognition. 2. Understand and analyse arguments in the relevant literature. 3. Critically evaluate these theories and arguments. 4. Develop their own views or perspectives through consideration and analysis of the views and arguments presented in the unit, and to present their own views with clarity and rigour. 5. Develop clarity of thought; clarity of verbal expression; clarity of written expression and exposition.

English Language

Reading and discussion.

Undergraduate students: Weekly Discussion Questions and Comments 30% Term paper (1500 words) 60% Attendance 10% Graduate students: Weekly Discussion Questions and Comments 30% Term paper (3000 words) 60% Attendance 10%

Selected readings McGeer, V. (2007). The regulative dimension of folk psychology. In D. D. Hutto and M. Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk-psychology Reassessed (pp 137–156). Dordrecht: Springer. McGeer, V. (2019) Mindshaping is Inescapable, Social Injustice is not: Reflections on Haslanger’s Critical Social Theory. Australasian Philosophical Review, 3(1): 48-59. Mameli, M. (2001). Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution. Biology and Philosophy, 16(5): 595-626. Zawidzki, T. W. (2008). The function of folk psychology: mind reading or mind shaping? Philosophical Explorations, 11(3): 193-210. Zawidzki, T. W. (2013). Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition. MIT Press.

時間

By appointment.

聯絡方式

chrismccarroll@nycu.edu.tw