心靈哲學：心靈所做的事情

This course provides an overview of issues in philosophy of mind with a focus on particular types of mental states and cognitive capacities, such as belief and desire, perception, memory, imagination, mental imagery, dreams. The course also looks at ways in which cognition can go wrong, as in the case of delusions. The course teaches students about some of the key debates in philosophy of mind in relation to these capacities: what is the nature of these capacities? What is relation between the capacities? By the end of the course, students will be familiar with the key debates about a range of mental phenomena, and in this way the course introduces students to key theories and ideas in philosophy of mind.

English Language Skills Analytic Skills

The goal of the course is to further students’ familiarity with some of the fundamental issues in philosophy of mind and cognition. By the end of the course students should be comfortable discussing some of the central problems in this field, offering critical responses to proposed solutions to these problems, and using their understanding to engage critically with the theories. Specifically, students should will be able to: 1. Demonstrate an awareness of central problems in Philosophy of Mind. 2. Understand and analyse arguments in the relevant literature. 3. Critically evaluate these theories and arguments. 4. Develop their own views or perspectives through consideration and analysis of the views and arguments presented in the unit, and to present their own views with clarity and rigour. 5. Develop clarity of thought; clarity of verbal expression; clarity of written expression and exposition.

Students are requested to come to each class with 2–3 questions for discussion, and participation in the discussions will count for 20% of the final grade. Students will be required to write 2 short reflection pieces (max 500 words each, 30%), and a short final paper on a topic of their choice (1500 words, 50%).

Quilty-Dunn, J., Mandelbaum, E. Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science. Philosophical Studies, 175, 2353–2372. Mandelbaum, E., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2015). Believing without reason, or: Why liberals shouldn’t watch Fox News. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 22, 42-52. Schroeder, T. (2010). Desire: Philosophical Issues. WIREs Cognitive Science, 1, 363-370. Nanay, B. (2019). Catching Desires. Aeon. https://aeon.co/essays/can-you-stop-yourself-being-infected-with-other-peoples-desires Crane, T. (2005). What is the Problem of Perception? Synthesis Philosophica 20, 2005: 237-264. Nanay, B. (2015). The Representationalism versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory Contextualism about Perception. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(2), 321-336. Michaelian, K., & Robins, S. K. (2018). Beyond the Causal Theory: 50 Years after Martin and Deutscher. Addis, D. R. (2018). Are episodic memories special? On the sameness of remembered and imagined event simulation. Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand, 48, 64-88. Van Leeuwen, N. (2013). The Meanings of Imagine – Part 1. Nanay, Bence, "Mental Imagery", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/mental-imagery/ Windt, J. (2018). Precis of Dreaming: A Conceptual Framework for Philosophy of Mind and Empirical Research. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25 (5-6), 6-29. Rosen & Sutton (2013). Self-Representation and Perspectives in Dreams. Philosophy Compass, 8(11), 1041-1053. Bortolotti (2018). Delusions and Three Myths of Irrational Belief. In Bortolotti (ed.), Delusions in Context. Palgrave Macmillan

時間

By appointment

聯絡方式

chrismccarroll@nycu.edu.tw