演算式機制設計與社會選擇
Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Social Choice
| 節 | 週一 |
|---|---|
A 18:30–19:20 | 演算式機制設計與社會選擇 MB312 3 節連堂 |
B 19:30–20:20 | |
C 20:30–21:20 |
* 根據陽明交大上課時間表所列
Algorithmic game theory and learning sprouts as an active interdisciplinary field integrating computer science and economics. While its impacting contributions, namely, the efficiency of equilibria and complexity of computing equilibria are more on the measurement and analysis side of equilibria, treating equilibria as an engineerable aggregated choice, “algorithmic mechanism design and social choice” which is more on the engineering side also develops promisingly in parallel and produces lots of interesting and well-unknown results. Based on the classical results in mechanism design and social choice in economics, our goals are introducing various mechanism design questions and topics from computational and algorithmic perspectives, complementary to algorithmic game theory and learning.
Algorithms, or Discrete Mathematics, or Economics
Homework: exercises (60%) Final presentation: assignment paper reading + presentation (40%)
| 週次 | 主題 |
|---|---|
| 第 1 週 | Introduction and overview |
| 第 2 週 | Game theory and equilibria (I) |
| 第 3 週 | Game theory and equilibria (II) |
| 第 4 週 | Introduction to mechanism design and social choice (I) |
| 第 5 週 | Introduction to mechanism design and social choice (II) |
| 第 6 週 | Introduction to mechanism design and social choice (III) |
| 第 7 週 | Classical Results: VCG Mechanisms (I) |
| 第 8 週 | Classical Results: VCG Mechanisms (II) |
| 第 9 週 | Classical Results: Myerson's Optimal Auctions - Mechanisms for Profit Maximization (I) |
| 第 10 週 | Classical Results: Myerson's Optimal Auctions - Mechanisms for Profit Maximization (II) |
| 第 11 週 | Classical Results: Myerson's Optimal Auctions - Mechanisms for Profit Maximization (III) |
| 第 12 週 | Other Topics: Sponsored Search, Prediction Markets, Other Methods as Mechanisms: Taxes and Others (I) |
| 第 13 週 | Other Topics: Sponsored Search, Prediction Markets, Other Methods as Mechanisms: Taxes and Others (II) |
| 第 14 週 | Other Topics: Sponsored Search, Prediction Markets, Other Methods as Mechanisms: Taxes and Others (III) |
| 第 15 週 | Mechanism design via learning |
| 第 16 週 | Final presentation |
Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory, Tim Roughgarden. 2016 Algorithmic Game Theory, edited by Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, and Vijay V. Vazirani. 2007 Handbook of Computational Social Choice. 2016 Auction Theory, V. Krishna. 2009 Microeconomics, A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green. 1995
- 時間
- by appointment
- 聯絡方式
- poanchen@nycu.edu.tw